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RULES RESTRICTING PLAYER MOVEMENT
UNDER THE FEDERATION
INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL:
Do THEY VIOLATE U.S. ANTITRUST LAW?
I. INTRODUCTION
Once again the world of soccer will make its mark in the courthouse.
For more than a century, soccer players in Europe have been restricted in
their ability to move from team to team. 2 The Federation Internationale de
Football Association ("FIFA"), the governing body of soccer worldwide,
has restricted player movement by adopting two rules: a controversial
transfer rule and a rule limiting the number of foreign players allowed on
a team.3
1. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 7 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D. Mass. 1998). Ten
players of Major League Soccer ("MLS") filed suit against the league on grounds that the
league's single entity status violates U.S. antitrust law. Id. at 73.
2. Peter N. Katz, A History of Free Agency in the United States and Great Britain: Who's
Leading the Charge?, 15 COMp. LAB. L.J. 371, 397-409 (1994). British football formed
its own association called the Football Association ("FA") in 1863, and its regulations
prevented players from moving from team to team under a retain-and-transfer system. Id.
at 397-99.
3. See generally Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Ass'n v.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (1995). This case dealt with the issue
regarding the transfer rules and their legality under Community law. Id. at 1-5056. See also
Regulations Governing the Status and Transfer of Football Players (visited Jan. 11, 1999)
<http://www.fifa.com/fifa/handbook/statutes/trans.preamble.html > [hereinafter FIFA
Regulations]. The current FIFA regulation regarding player transfer is Chapter V Article
14 of the Regulations. Id. This provides that a team must receive compensation if a player
transfers to a new club. Id. Chapter III Article 6 of the Regulations concerns foreign player
restrictions and provides that "only a player who is currently registered by a national
association to play for one of its clubs shall be admitted to competitions organized by that
national association." Id. Players who attempt to transfer from one national association to
another must comply with Chapter III Article 6 and Chapter IV Article 7 in order to play.
Id. Further, the regulations of Major League Soccer ("MLS") only allow a maximum of
5 international players on an MLS club. See MLSNET: Regulations (visited Jan. 11, 1999)
< http://www.mlsnet.com/about/regulations .html > [hereinafter MLS Regulations].
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Recently, in Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Ass'n v.
Bosman, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") limited the restrictions by
holding that a European Union ("EU") citizen could not be denied his or
her right to freedom of movement within the EU.4 FIFA changed its
transfer rule and foreign player limits in order to comply with the ECJ's
ruling.' However, FIFA maintained the rules for foreign players who play
in the EU and for any players who play outside the EU.6 With the new
rule, FIFA sanctioned Major League Soccer ("MLS") in the United States
("US") while maintaining its transfer rule and foreign player limit, because
MLS is designed as a single entity.7 MLS players seek the same benefits
of the free market as their EU counterparts who play within the EU.8
This Note argues that the structure of MLS is not a "sham" and, as
such, does not violate U.S. antitrust law. Part II discusses the history of
U.S. antitrust law in the context of sports and the application of the single
entity defense in antitrust cases. Part III discusses the history behind the
FIFA rules restricting player movement within the EU, and briefly explains
the rationale behind the Bosman decision. Part IV argues that Major
League Soccer's single entity defense is valid and that it should withstand
antitrust scrutiny. Part IV, also, asserts that an adverse ruling against MLS
(and, by implication, FIFA) can lead to numerous problems in the world
of soccer. If FIFA and all of the world soccer leagues are continually
forced to abandon the rules restricting player movement, free agency will
result in a sharp increase in player salaries, thereby forcing smaller-market
teams out of the league and jeopardizing a league's existence.I Finally, Part
V applies U.S. Antitrust law and policy to the FIFA structure.
4. See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-5081.
5. FIFA Regulations, supra note 3. The FIFA Executive Committee caused the FIFA
Regulations to come into effect on October 1, 1997. See also A. Craig Copetas & Stefan
Fatsic, Pitch Battle: Soccer's Lords Take on Free-Market Forces-Suits Over Player
Transfers May Dictate Who Really Runs the Sport, WALL ST. J. EuR., July 28, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, News Library, ALLNEWS File.
6. Copetas, supra note 5.
7. Stuart Doughty, Soccer-United States to Launch Professional League in 1995, THE
REUrER LEBR. REP., Dec. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
FIFA sanctioned MLS in the U.S. See About MLS (visited Jan. 11, 1999)
< http://www.mlsnet.com/about/#The Structure.html >. The transfer rule is designed so
that when a player's contract ends and the player signs with another team, the former team
must be compensated. See Copetas, supra note 5. The foreign player restriction limits the
number of foreign citizens allowed to play in MLS. Id.
8. Copetas, supra note 5.
9. Id.
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Proponents of a free market may argue that American sports have
survived under a free agency system and that FIFA should follow suit.
This Note argues that American sports leagues have fallen prey to economic
pressures and that FIFA's philosophy of maintaining the integrity of the
game is a better method to combat economic pressures. ' 0 FIFA, as the
governing body of soccer worldwide, can outlaw the U.S. Soccer
Federation ("USSF") if the Court rules against MLS. This will create
further problems for the U.S. Soccer Team and could inhibit its chance of
qualifying for the World Cup. " A ruling against MLS can also persuade
FIFA to deny the right to form leagues in Africa, Latin America, and
Asia. 12
H. THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
A. The Emergence of Antitrust Law in American Sports
1. A Brief History of the Sherman Act and its Application to Interstate
Commerce
US antitrust law has had a serious impact on the world of sports,
especially with regard to restraints on player movement.' 3 The Sherman
Act was designed to outlaw monopolies and create fair competition among
entities. Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, "every contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in the restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states" is illegal. '" In 1922, U.S. antitrust law entered
sports in the controversial case of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc.
v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs. 16 In that case, the
Supreme Court declared baseball exempt from antitrust law. 7 The Court




13. MATTHEW C. McKINNON ET AL., SPORTS LAW 3-1 (1996).
14. WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., SPORTS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 52 (2d ed. 1993).
15. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
16. See generally Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Prof'I
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
17. Id. at 208. The Court held that "the business ... of baseball... [was] purely state
affairs," and therefore, does not involve interstate commerce. Id.
18. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Here, the court was unwilling to change
4091999]
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recently enacted the Curt Flood Act, thereby legislatively overruling the
exemption for baseball.19
2. The Court's Legal Approach to an Antitrust Controversy
There are two tests that a court may use when declaring a violation
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 ' The first test is whether the action
taken by a league is a per se violation. 2' A per se violation results when
agreements or "practices have been deemed to be so pernicious as to be
illegal per se [such as] boycotts and concerted refusals to deal." 22
However, the courts usually rely on the second test when determining a
violation under the Act.23 The second test is the Rule of Reason approach.24
This test decides "whether the restraint imposed is justified by legitimate
business purposes, and is no more restrictive than necessary. "2
the exemption with regard to baseball even though they knew that the sport affected
interstate commerce. The court deferred the matter to legislature and reserved the
exemption to baseball under stare decisis. Id. at 284. However, the Supreme Court made
clear that the baseball exemption did not apply to other sports like football and basketball
because they do effect interstate commerce. See Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n,
401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452
(1957).
19. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998).
20. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606,616 (8th Cir. 1976). The district
court held that the Pete Rozelle Rule was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 620.
However, the 8th Circuit felt the Rule of Reason test was more appropriate. Id.
21. Id. at 618-20. A court will only find an antitrust violation if the agreement is
unreasonable. Id. at 618. "As the court gained experience with antitrust problems arising
under the Sherman Act, they identified certain types of agreements as being so consistently
unreasonable that they may be deemed to be illegal per se, without inquiry into their
purported justifications." Id. (quoting Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 5 (1958)).
22. Id. at 618.
23. CHAMPION, supra note 14, at 53. Even though teams compete against one another,
professional sports can not survive without some form of cooperation between the teams.
For example, in order to maintain the existence of a sports league, all of the members must
agree to follow the rules to be enforced in the game. Id at 55.
24. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620.
25. Id.
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3. Player Restraints Utilized by American Sports
American sports have used various methods to restrain movement of
players among the teams, such as draft systems and option or reserve
clauses.26 Mackey v. National Football League addresses the issue of
restrictions on free agency.27 The National Football League ("NFL")
implemented the Rozelle Rule. Under this rule, if a player's contract
expired and the player signed with another team, the new team had to
compensate the former team.28 If the teams did not reach an agreement
regarding compensation, then the Commissioner would step in to make the
determination. 9 The Court, utilizing the Rule of Reason test, held that the
Rozelle Rule was an unreasonable restraint on trade.30
B. The Single Entity Defense and Its Role in American Sports
1. The Basic Concept Behind the Single Entity Defense
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prevents acts of collusion between two
participants. 3' Therefore, if an antitrust issue came before a court and it
was determined that only a single entity existed, there would be no reason
to determine whether an antitrust controversy existed under Section 1 of the
26. MCKINNON, supra note 13, at 3-28. The leagues have set up regulations and devices
primarily to restrict player movement.
The draft is the method used by team sports to allocate players who have
not previously played professional sports. Athletes who are eligible for
the draft are generally selected in the reverse order of the team's standing
from the previous year's competition. . . . Reserve or option systems
typically give the team for whom an athlete is currently playing, a
unilateral right to renew the contract for an additional period of time under
the same terms and conditions as the current contract. As with the draft,
the number of times a team can unilaterally 'renew' a contract varies from
league to league.
Id.
27. See generally Mackey, 543 F.2d 606.
28. Id. at 609. The Rozelle Rule was quite similar in nature to FIFA's transfer rules by
requiring that the former team be compensated. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Under the Rozelle Rule, compensation was usually money, current players, or future
selections in the draft. See CHAMPION, supra note 14, at 54.
29. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609.
30. Id. at 622.
31. Bradley I. Ruskin et al., Fraser v. Major League Soccer and the League "Single
Enterprise" Defence, SPORTS L. ADMIN. & PRAC., May-June 1997, at 6, 7.
1999]
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Act.32 Many leagues have tried to utilize this defense and failed. However,
the recent application of the single entity defense has provided a valid
exception to antitrust liability.33
2. History Behind the Single Entity Defense
The early stages of the single entity defense had virtually no bearing
on antitrust law until 1984. 4 Prior to 1984, many sports leagues tried to
invoke the defense but had continually failed.35 In one instance, the North
American Soccer League ("NASL") sued the NFL for violation of the
Sherman Act. 36 Specifically, the NASL wanted the NFL's ban on cross-
ownership of other sports franchises to be abolished. 37 The NFL claimed
that it was a single entity and, as such, could not be found liable of
violating the Sherman Act. However, the Supreme Court held that the
cross-ownership regulation failed under the Rule of Reason test, violating
antitrust law. 39 On the single entity claim, the Court ruled that the anti-
competitive effects of the rule outweighed the benefits of the restraint and
thus, the structure of the league should not be used as an escape clause from
liability. 4°
The NFL tried using the single entity defense again in Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League.4' Los Angeles Memorial
32. Id. at 6. The Sherman Act requires that "in order to constitute a conspiracy two
separate business entities must be involved." Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
This Supreme Court decision led to the utilization of the single entity defense in the context
of sports leagues. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 6.
35. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 6.
36. North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1250 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). The issue the court faced was whether
agreements between members of the NFL, prohibiting its members from making investments
in other leagues such as NASL, violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 1250.
37. Id. at 1255. NASL wanted the court to abolish the restriction because of the limited
resources that were available. Id. at 1253. Only owners with substantial assets were able
to purchase NASL teams. Id.
38. Id. at 1256.
39. Id. at 1261.
40. Id. at 1257-58, 1261.
41. See generally Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum v. National Football League, 726 F.2d.
1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). Al Davis, the managing
general partner of the Oakland Raiders, sought to move his team to Los Angeles after the
Oakland Coliseum contract expired and his attempts to secure improvements to the Oakland
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Coliseum sued the NFL claiming the league's rule restricting franchise
movement violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.4' Again, the Court was
unwilling to allow the NFL to claim single entity status.4 3 More
specifically, the Court found that each of the teams were single structures
competing with one another." The Supreme Court was unwilling to apply
the defense in the context of the structures of major sports leagues.
Nonetheless, the Court still did not completely abandon the theory behind
this defense.45
3. The Single Entity Defense Attains Validity
In 1984, the single entity defense developed a following outside the
realm of sports.' In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the
Supreme Court allowed Copperweld Corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary to use the single entity defense.47 The plaintiff brought an action
claiming that the Copperweld Corporation and its subsidiary violated
antitrust law.48 The Court ruled that the parent and its subsidiary could not
possibly be in violation of antitrust law under Section 1 of the Act because
they were incapable of conspiring with one another.4 9 Copperweld
Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were a single entity.50
Coliseum failed. Id. at 1385.
42. Id. at 1387.
43. Id. at 1390.
44. Id. The court found that:
[Iun addition to being independent business entities, the NFL clubs [did]
compete with one another off the field as well as on to acquire players,
coaches, and management personnel. In certain areas of the country
where two teams operate in close proximity, there is also competition for
fan support, local television and local radio revenues, and media space.
Id.
45. See North Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. at 1077 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). "[The]
NFL teams compete with one another on the playing field; [however,] . . . [iun all other
respects, the [NFL] competes as a unit against other forms of entertainment." Id.
46. See generally Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
47. Id. at 775-77.
48. Id. at 757-58.
49. Id. at 777.
50. Id. at 771.
Regal was operated as an unincorporated division of Lear Siegler for four
years before it became a wholly owned subsidiary of Copperweld. ...
Under either arrangement [as an unincorporated division or a wholly
owned subsidiary], Regal might have acted to bar a new competitor from
1999] 413
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Further, the Court found that the agreement between Copperweld and its
subsidiary was different from the situation where two separate entities
conspire. 5' The Court reasoned that prior to conspiring, two separate
entities have different economic interests, whereas a parent and wholly
owned subsidiary do not have separate economic interests. 52 There are two
factors that the court should consider when a corporation utilizes this
defense.53 First, the court must determine if the entity has a "complete
unity of interests. ' 54  Second, the court must determine "whether the
alleged restraint brings formally independent economic factors into a
common plan. ",s
5
4. The Single Entity Defense Under Copperweld as Applied to Sports
Structures
The single entity defense under Copperweld was utilized by the
Professional Golf Association ("PGA") in Seabury Management, Inc. v.
Professional Golf Ass'n of America, Inc.56 The structure of the PGA
entering the market .... From the standpoint of the antitrust laws, there
is no reason to treat one more harshly than the other.
Id. at 774.
51. Id. at 769, 771.
52. Id.
53. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 6.
54. See Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 771. Under the first factor, a "parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest." Id. The court mentioned that
a parent and subsidiary may be able to conspire and listed factors to consider to "measure
the 'separateness' of the subsidiary." Id. at 771 n. 18.
[However,] when a subsidiary is wholly owned .... these factors are not
sufficient to describe a separate economic entity for purposes of the
Sherman Act .... [The factors] cannot overcome the basic fact that the
ultimate interests of the subsidiary and the parent are identical, so the
parent and the subsidiary must be viewed as a single economic unit.
Id.
55. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 6. Under the second factor, the court must look at whether
separate economic factors existed prior to the alleged restraint.
Separate incorporation may improve management, avoid special tax
problems arising from multistate operations, or serve other legitimate
interests .... [A] business enterprise should be free to structure itself in
ways that serve efficiency of control, economy of operations, and other
factors dictated by business judgment without increasing its exposure to
antitrust liability.
See Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 772-73.
56. See generally Seabury Management, Inc. v. Professional Golf Ass'n of Am., Inc.,
414 [Vol. 18
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consisted of its main association and several regional sections.57 Each office
was separately incorporated and controlled by the PGA.58 The plaintiff
claimed that the PGA and one of its regional sections had violated the
Sherman Act.5 9 The District Court of Maryland decided that the PGA was
a single entity' by looking at the structure of the PGA.16  Ultimately, the
court reasoned that the PGA and its regional section could not possibly
conspire because "the PGA ... function[s] as a single economic unit with
the PGA, possessing ultimate control over the actions of the individual
sections. ,62
The National Basketball Association ("NBA") also tried to invoke the
single entity defense in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v.
National Basketball Ass "n.63 The Chicago Bulls and WGN television sued
the NBA claiming that a league regulation restricting the number of cable
telecasts of Chicago Bulls games was an illegal restraint on trade. 4 The
court did not rule on the structure of the NBA but did state that a sports
league could utilize the single entity defense .65 Further, the court stated that
in order to determine if a sports league is a single entity "it is essential to
investigate [the league's] organization and [utilize] Copperweld's function
question one league at a time-and perhaps one facet of a league at a
time. "66
878 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1994).
57. Id. at 777.
58. Id.
59. Id. Seabury Management, Inc. ("Seabury") argued that "the PGA and MAPGA, a
PGA section, conspired to limit Seabury's ability to conduct a golf trade show in violation
of the Sherman Act. Id.
60. Id at 778.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 777.
63. See generally Chicago Prof)I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n,
95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (analyzing whether the NBA should be considered a single firm
when selling broadcast rights to networks under the Rule of Reason approach).
64. Id. at 595. See also Jeffrey Gewirtz, The NBA Loses Another Round in the
Superstation Fight, THE SPORTS LAW. (Sports Law. Assoc.) July-Aug. 1995, at 1. The
NBA reduced the number of games that WGN Television was able to televise from 25 to 20
games. Id.
65. See Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership, 95 F.3d at 598-99.
66. Id. at 600.
19991 415
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Since Copperweld, the NFL has repeatedly tried to invoke the single
entity defense. 67 On two occasions, the court refused to allow the defense.6"
On one occasion, the court held in Sullivan v. National Football League
that the NFL did not function under a "unity of interests." 69 The NFL
teams each "pursued interests diverse from those of the [NFL]."7
Specifically, the court found that the NFL teams compete against each other
for players, coaches, fans, and broadcast revenues.7'
1H. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE TRANSFER RULES
A. An Introduction to the World of Soccer and
the Creation of the Transfer Rules
1. England's Football Clubs
Football (referred to as "soccer" in the United States) started during
feudalism in England." English society held on to the sport with great
enthusiasm during that time and, later on during the 1800's, many football
clubs formed in England.73 It was in 1863, that the Football Association
("FA") was formed.74 Although many other football associations formed
throughout England, the FA was considered the primary authority of
football.75 The other associations, usually amateur clubs, were considered
secondary.76
67. See Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 1252 (1995). William H. Sullivan II, and his son sold their interest in the
New England Patriots after the NFL refused to allow Sullivan to sell stock in the NFL team
to the public. Id. at 1096. Sullivan argued that the NFL policy restricting Sullivan to sell
stock in his team was a violation under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. See also McNeil v.
National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 878 (D. Minn. 1992).
68. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1090; McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 880.
69. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099.
70. Id.
71. Ted Curtis & Jeffrey Gewirtz, NFL Wins New Trial in Sullivan Antitrust Case, THE
SPORTS LAW. (Sports Law. Assoc.), Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 9.
72. Katz, supra note 2, at 397.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 398.
76. Id.
[Vol. 18416
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2. The Beginning of the Retain and Transfer Rule
The FA, upon its inception, set up regulations for the clubs in order to
have a unified set of rules between its members and for football." As the
sport grew in popularity, players embraced football as a career choice. )s
Hence, football became a professionalized sport as players were paid
salaries for their performances. 9 Wishing to keep its players from the other
competing associations, the FA set up the Retain and Transfer Rule. °
3. The FA Retain and Transfer Rule
This Retain and Transfer Rule was designed primarily to limit player
movement."' This rule was also designed in order to preserve the integrity
of the game and preserve competition between clubs.2 The FA feared that
smaller market clubs would be unable to compete with the larger market
clubs without a retain and transfer rule. 83 Teams with the most money
would have an unfair advantage and jeopardize the smaller market clubs,
possibly endangering the existence of the FA.4
The rule stated that, "after a player's contract had expired, an option
period, controlled exclusively by the club, began." 5 The club could
exercise the option, and the player would at least receive the benefits of his
existing contract.8 6 The players who signed, or were in the process of
signing, were put on a retention list.8 7 If the option was not exercised, the
player would be put on a transfer list. Other teams that wanted to sign this
player were required to pay the former team. 8
77. Id. at 397. The FA members "agreed to play each other under one set of rules." Id.
78. Id. at 398-99. Players at the age of 18 seeking to attain an education instead of
entering professional football are required to wait two years before signing a professional
contract. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 401-02.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 402.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 401.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 402.
88. Id.
19991 417
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4. The Legality of the Transfer Rules
Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club is a case which attacked
football's rules restricting player movement.89 The court decided an issue
regarding the legality of the retain and transfer rule utilized by FA.9 The
court ruled that the practice of placing players on a retention list was a
restraint on trade. 9' However, the court did allow the transfer rule to
continue.' The court reasoned that players were not restricted in their
ability to move under the transfer rule.93 By taking into consideration the
fact that the rule allowed a player to appeal a transfer fee, the court decided
that the players were still able to move freely.'
5. Other Regulations Designed to Restrain Player Movement
The FA also restricts player movement by maintaining limits on the
number of foreign players that team may have on its roster.95 The foreign
player limit rule was prevalent under FA regulations when the FA joined
FIFA.96 All FIFA members have enforced such a regulation on their
teams.97 FIFA maintains such a regulation in order to preserve football at
the international level.98 However, the validity behind this rule started to
fall apart due to a European Community ("EC") decision in Dona v.
Mantero.9 The court held that EC members cannot be restricted from
playing football in other EC member states. 1°° Although the FA was
89. See generally Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club, 11964] 1 Ch. 413 (Eng.
1963).
90. Id. at 421.
91. Id. at 429-31.
92. Id. at 431, 437.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Katz, supra note 2, at 405.
96. Id.
97. Jon S. Greenwood, What Major League Baseball Can Learn From Its International
Counterparts: Building a Model Collective-Bargaining Agreement for Major League
Baseball, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 581, 606 (1995).
98. Copetas, supra note 5, at 1. Again, FIFA's motto is "for the good of the game." Id.
99. See generally Case 13/76, Dona v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, 2 C.M.L.R. 578
(1976).
100. Id. at 1342.
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unwilling to follow the EC ruling, the FA was forced to comply with the
essential holding following the Bosman decision. 101
B. The Bosman Decision
1. The Facts Behind the Bosman Decision
The Bosman decision virtually declared the transfer rule and the foreign
player restrictions on EU players under the FA and FIFA illegal under
Community Law. 102 Jean-Marie Bosman, a Belgian national brought an
action against Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Association
("URBSFA"). °3 He wanted the URBSFA rules restricting player
movement declared illegal after the association denied him the ability to
secure a contract with a French division team."0 Bosman played for a
Belgium football club, the RC liege. l05 After refusing to sign with the
team, Bosman was placed on the transfer list and signed with the French
team US Dunkerque. o6 US Dunkerque paid the transfer fee but the transfer
did not take effect and forced Bosman to sit out an entire season. 1
0 7
2. The Ruling by the ECJ
The ECJ held that the transfer rule and the restrictions on foreign
players were inconsistent with Community law. 108 The ECJ looked at the
rules and applied them to the Treaty Establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty"). °9  Specifically, Article 48 protects the freedom of
movement for workers in the 15 Member States of the EU. "I Also,
"discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited within the EC
Treaty's scope of application."11' By invoking Article 48 of the EC Treaty,
101. Katz, supra note 2, at 406, 407.
102. See Bosman, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-5081.
103. Id. at 1-5051, 1-5053.
104. Id. at 1-5053.
105. Id. at 1-5050.
106. Id. at 1-5050, 1-5051.
107. Id. at 1-5051.
108. Id. at 1-5081.
109. Id. at 1-5062, 1-5073. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7,
1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC TREATY].
110. EC TREATY art. 48.
111. Andrew W. Lee, The Bosman Case: Protecting Freedom of Movement in European
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the ECJ ruled that the transfer rule and the rule limiting foreign players
violates the provision guaranteeing free movement.112
3. The Effects of the ECJ Ruling
The Bosman ruling has drastically changed the application of the
restrictions on player movement in the EU. 113  FIFA and its members
lobbied "member State governments for an amendment of the EC Treaty to
exempt sports associations from Community law on freedom of movement
for workers."11 4 One year after the Bosman decision, FIFA changed its
transfer rule to comply with the ECJ's ruling." 5 There have been some
problems for players who attempted to transfer under the new rule because
of the rule's inconsistencies. "1
6
Football, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1255, 1264-65 (1996) (citing EC TREATY art. 6).
112. See Bosman, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-5081 (note that Article 48, which deals with free
movement between member nations, applies to professional sports players).
113. Copetas, supra note 5.
FIFA [amended] its edicts to comply with the court's judgment and said
players could change teams within the EU without transfer fees at the end
of their contracts. The decision gave players the right to test their value
on the open market, and allowed the wealthier club owners to take off on
cross-border player-buying sprees.
Id.
114. Lee, supra note 111, at 1258.
115. Copetas, supra note 5. FIFA changed its transfer rule but the rule only applies to
EU citizens playing in the EU. Id.
FIFA's ... bewildering immigration rules, which require leagues to pay
substantial compensation before signing a player who previously played
for another league or team, even if the player is no longer under contract,
remain enforced everywhere outside the EU, and inside the EU for those
foreign players signed to European teams and who wish to move
elsewhere in the union.
Id.
116. Id. "FIFA validated Inter Milan's estimated $40 million purchase package for
Ronaldo, the Brazilian striker from FC Barcelona." Id. FIFA could have prevented the
deal, but FIFA did not. Id. Yet, FIFA did block a French player (EU citizen) from
transferring from a non-EU team to an EU team. Id.
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IV. FIFA TRANSFER RULE & FOREIGN PLAYER
RESTRICTIONS IN MLS
A. The Startup of MLS
1. History of Soccer in America
American soccer has had its ups and downs over the years. "7 Prior to
MLS, other professional soccer leagues formed in the U.S. and tried to
achieve the status and popularity of other American sports leagues. 8 For
the most part, the U.S. had been without an outdoor professional soccer
league." 9 Also, the U.S. has not had a very strong national team in the
past. 20 However, just recently, the U.S. started competing at the national
level with some success. 12' This helped create a newfound popularity for
the sport. 1
22
117. See North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1252
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). One American professional soccer
league, NASL, was founded in 1968. Id. "Soccer was not a widely followed or popular
sport when the NASL was founded, and several earlier attempts to put together a
professional soccer league failed due to lack of fan interest." Id. NASL did flourish in the
1970s due to players like Pele and Franz Beckenbauer; however, the league folded in 1984.
America Tastes and Sees the Game is Good, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, July 17, 1994,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
118. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
119. U.S. Soccer League Start Postponed for a Year, RETrERS NORTH AMERiCAN WIRE,
Nov. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. See also Sven Busch,
World Cup a Success in America, but What about the New League, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
ARGENTUR, July 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
120. Colin Malam, Soccer World Cup: FIFA Bask in Smash-Hit Success USA 94,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, July 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
In the 1990 World Cup, the U.S. lost every single match. Id.
121. Id.
Happily, [the U.S. has] made significant progress since their harsh World
Cup experience four years ago, when they lost every game. Beating
Columbia... 2-1 and losing only 1-0 to Brazil [the winners of World Cup
94] could prove real land marks in their development. It is accepted here
that a strong professional domestic league is essential to the United States'
prospects of ever making a realistic challenge for the World Cup.
Id.
122. Id. Attendance at the 1994 World Cup in America has been record setting when
compared to all the prior World Cup tournaments. Id.
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2. The World Cup
Soccer's increased popularity was largely due to the U.S. 's ability to
compete in the World Cup Tournaments. 23 The U.S. 's interest in soccer
increased when FIFA selected the U.S. as the host of the 1994 World
Cup. 124 This was unusual because MLS did not have a top level outdoor
professional soccer league. 125 However, FIFA made a concession to the
U.S., especially in light of the large market potential. 126
3. Conditions Under which the U.S. was Awarded the 1994 World Cup
Tournament
FIFA imposed a condition subsequent after awarding the World Cup
Tournament to the U.S. 127 The U.S. was required to start up a new outdoor
professional soccer league. 128  The President of the USSF, Alan
Rothenberg, headed the plans for the new league, MLS. 129  With the
increased popularity of soccer, the timing for the MLS was perfect. 130
However, the league opening was postponed for a year in order to raise
capital, attract more investors, lock in cities that were awarded franchises,
and attract overseas players. 131
123. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. "The U.S. team [has] ... gained
respect and [has] been invited to play at the Maracana stadium in Rio against world
champions Brazil and against England at soccer temple Wimbley." Paul Radford,
Soccer-Americans Launch 10-Year Plan for U.S. Soccer, REUTERS NORTH AMERICAN
WIRE, July 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
124. U.S. Soccer League Start Postponed for a Year, supra note 119.
125. Id.
126. America Tastes and Sees that the Game is Good, supra note 117. FIFA made $75
million in profits from World Cup 94. Id.
127. U.S. Soccer League Start Postponed for a Year, supra note 119. "When FIFA
surprised the soccer world by awarding the 1994 World Cup to the United States a country
that [had] no outdoor league a major condition was that a top level division one professional
soccer league be developed." Id.
128. Id.
129. America Tastes and Sees that the Game is Good, supra note 117; About MLS, supra
note 7.
130. See Jim Slater, World Cup Opportunity Lost for U.S. Football, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. The success
of the U.S. World Cup provided a perfect opportunity for the start up of MLS because of
increased fan support and the shutdowns of Major League Baseball and the National Hockey
League. Id.
131. Id. See also Ken Jones, Football: Major League Soccer or Fantasy League?, THE
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B. The Structure of MLS
1. The Corporate Form of MLS
MLS, a limited liability company, owns twelve teams in the U.S.' 32
The league operates as a single entity.' 33 Investors operate ten teams in the
league, while MLS operates the other two. 34 Most of the investors are part
of the MLS management committee. 35 The management committee handles
all of the business decisions, such as, negotiating contracts, paying salaries,
assigning players to teams, and conducting a player draft.'36 Each investor
shares the profits and losses on a pro rata basis, similar to shareholders in
a corporation.'37  In addition, investors share in the revenues and
expenses. '38 The team operators receive a salary for running the operation
of the team, which includes the hiring of personnel.'39
2. The Arguments For and Against the Structure of MLS
In Fraser v. Major League Soccer,140 ten players have filed a suit
asking District Court Judge O'Toole to declare that the structure of MLS
is a "sham, " it restricts player movement, and MLS, USSF, and FIFA have
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
132. About MLS, supra note 7.
133. Id.
134. In 1996, MLS started out with ten teams. MLS owned all ten teams, but investors
operated seven teams while MLS operated the other three. See Ruskin, supra note 31, at
7. MLS currently owns twelve teams with the adding of the 1998 expansion teams, the
Chicago Fire and Miami Fusion. See About MLS, supra note 7. However, MLS now
operates only two teams, the Dallas Burn and the Tampa Bay Mutiny. See Jerry Langdon,
MLS Gets $100 Million Infusion, GANNETr NEws SERVICE, Nov. 9, 1998, available in
WESTLAW, News Library, ALLNEWS File. The expansion teams are operated by
investors. See Frank Dell'Apa, It's Political Football in Champions League, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 25, 1998, available in WESTLAW, News Library, ALLNEWS File; and Ike
Kuhns, Orlando Chosen to Host 1998 All-Star Game, THE STAR LEDGER, July 9, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, News Library, ALLNEWS File.





140. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 7 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D. Mass. 1998).
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conspired in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 14' The players feel
that the transfer rule is being used in order to prevent salary increases. 142
The players also want to operate under a free agency system without any
restraints on player movement. 143 MLS believes that the single corporate
entity structure is necessary in order to promote the game in America. "
Specifically, MLS responded to the complaint by asserting the single entity
defense, arguing that its actions cannot be challenged under antitrust law. 1
45
3. MLS as a Single Entity
The MLS structure does appear to fall within the single entity structure
test under Copperweld.146  By applying the facts of Frasier to the
Copperweld test, MLS can show that its structure is exactly that of a
principal and its wholly owned subsidiaries 147 which may claim the single
entity defense. 148 In addition, MLS exercises centralized control over the
operations by "making all the corporate decisions affecting the league and
the teams. "149 Further, the teams are not separate entities competing with
one another outside the sport, because no separate person actually owns one
team alone.150 In fact, two of the teams are run by MLS while ten are
operated by investors.'51 Investors own units in MLS, not the teams. 1
52
The fact that all of the investors share in the investment of MLS and not in
an individual team's income proves that the teams are not in competition
with each other off the field. 1
53
141. Copetas, supra note 5; Ruskin, supra note 31, at 7.
142. Players Want FIFA Rules Kicked Out of Bounds, EDMONTON J., May 6, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, News Library, ALLNEWS File.
143. Copetas, supra note 5.
144. About MLS, supra note 7.
145. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 7.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. The text indicates the factors that must
be applied in determining a single entity. Id.
147. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
148. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 7.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
152. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 7.
153. Id.
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C. The Implications of an Adverse Ruling to the Transfer Rule
Demands that the Rule be Allowed
1. A Fee Agency System will Substantially Hurt the Integrity of Soccer
FIFA and MLS want to preserve the integrity of the game. 5 4 FIFA
has maintained one motto throughout its long history: "for the good of the
game," and it incorporates this motto into its rules and regulations. 55 FIFA
is concerned that if there are no checks on player movement chaos will take
over the league. 15 6 Primarily, FIFA does not want to see player salaries
skyrocket. 157  The reason behind FIFA's fear is because certain
large-market teams may enjoy an advantage over small-market teams."' 8
Teams with more money will be able to attract the better players in the
leagues.' 59 Also, FIFA does not want to see MLS take all of the world's
foreign players, thus damaging other leagues. 16 This author believes FIFA
is probably afraid that the best players around the world will only want to
play for MLS because of the chance to attain great wealth in the U.S.
2. FIFA does not want to Succumb to the Economic Pressures that have
Permeated American Sports
Some commentators argue that American sports leagues have been able
to survive under a free agency system. This author agrees that such an
argument is valid because all the major sports leagues still do exist.
However, such an argument fails to explain the economic pressures the four
154. Copetas, supra note 5; About MLS, supra note 7.




159. Id. This will severely hurt the smaller market teams where they will no longer be
able to compete and may have to abandon their markets or fold. Id. This can severely
damage an entire league's existence. Id.
160. MLS Regulations, supra note 3.
MLS teams are allowed a maximum of five (5) international players on
their active rosters. MLS has established that a player is considered an
international player unless: the player is a [US] citizen, the player is in the
[US] as a resident alien (green card) or under asylum protection and is
eligible to play for the U.S. National Team.
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leagues (football, hockey, baseball, and basketball) have succumbed to and
does not fully consider the FIFA philosophy.
Two of the four major leagues have tired the fans with constant
bickering between management and labor."'6 The desire to attain the most
wealth during the baseball stoppage made many of the fans stray away
from America's greatest pastime. 62 The NFL has also hurt the fans by
giving owners the ability to seek new stadiums and allowing the owners to
find ways to circumvent the salary cap and revenue sharing agreements.' 63
Cities are being extorted by the demands of NFL owners, especially with
regard to stadium economics.'64 It appears that the motivating factor is
money. FIFA wants to profit just like any other sports organization but it
is unwilling to allow itself to succumb to the pressure by letting players
force management to increase their salaries. 165 FIFA seeks to maintain the
spirit of the game. 1 Some argue that this is unrealistic due to profit motive
and lucrative television contracts. 67  However, FIFA has been able to
succeed without completely changing its rules and overall motto. This
author does not think that FIFA is completely ignorant to the desire of
attaining wealth, but their motto is designed to maintain the integrity of the
game. Part of this integrity is to maintain fan loyalty and not become
completely absorbed with the large money potential of soccer. This is just
161. See supra text accompanying note 129. The baseball and hockey strikes in 1994
created some fan disparity. This helped create some fan support for soccer. The recent
public disfavor with the NBA strike also shows how fans are upset with management and
players fighting over money.
162. Thomas Boswell, The NFL's Pandora's Box; NFL's TVDeal Could Open Pandora's
Box, WASH. POST., Jan. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL2462345 WESTLAW, News
Library, ALLNEWS File.
163. Edward Robinson, It's Where You Play that Counts, FORTUNE, July 21, 1997, at 57.
"Because of new economic realities, team owners are now willing to pull up stakes, alienate
their devoted fans, and move clear across the country in order to get a new stadium." Id.
Damon Hack, It's Time for the NFL's Oldest Team to Retool Among Free Agents,
Stubblefield, Floyd are 49ers' Top Priorities, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 13, 1998,
available in WESTLAW, News Library, ALLNEWS File. For example, "the 49ers have
found ways to circumvent the cap in previous seasons." Id. Geoff Hobson, A Rivalry in
NFL Philosophy Bengals, Cowboys Differ in Approach, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec. 10, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, News Library, ALLNEWS File. Another example is Jerry Jones
of the Dallas Cowboys who made further plans to cut the Cowboys from the NFL's revenue
sharing plan. Id.
164. Robinson, supra note 163, at 54.
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another part of the reason why FIFA wants to keep its rules intact.161
Further, World Cup soccer is the most popular sport in the world. 169
Therefore, this author believes FIFA's motto should be used as a model for
other sports. 170
3. The Possible Expulsion of the USSF
Since FIFA required the USSF to start MLS, they may expel the USSF
for noncompliance with FIFA's rules. At this point in time, the USSF has
worked hard to gain standing in the international realm of soccer. 171 The
U.S. has succeeded in attaining top level status in sports over the years.
However, it has taken the U.S. a long time to even be viewed by the world
as a perennial soccer power. 17 2 Soccer is by far the number one sport
across the world. 7 3  The U.S. has always wanted to be a part of
international soccer and wants to continue being a part of international
soccer after capturing the interest of soccer fans in the U.S. in the 1994
World Cup.'74
FIFA has complete control over who is allowed to participate in the
World Cup and international soccer. 17 It would be a shame if the USSF,
which has built itself up to world level, was no longer able to participate in
FIFA. This would occur if, in Frasier, there is a ruling adverse to MLS.
Some commentators believe that FIFA will not ban the USSF from
168. Id.
169. Mathew Engel, Soccer? Who's a Sucker?, THE GUARDIAN, June 17, 1994, available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
170. About MLS, supra note 7.
MLS believes [the] single entity structure enables it to avoid many of the
pitfalls that have plagued other professional sports leagues. This single
entity design provides MLS and its members with the ability to: limit the
financial disparities between large and small markets; offer commercial
affiliates an integrated sponsorship and licensing program; decrease the
opportunity for sponsorship ambush; gain economies of scale in
purchasing power and cost control; and make decisions in the best interest
of the entire league rather than just one team.
Id.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 121, 123.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 117, 123.
173. Engel, supra note 169.
174. See supra text accompanying note 122.
175. Copetas, supra note 5.
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international soccer. 176 However, a ban seems likely because "the last thing
[FIFA] wants to see is the world's biggest market not being compliant with
its wishes." 77 It is this author's opinion that the ban is likely because
World Cup Soccer has succeeded without the U.S.'s involvement. Further,
even if FIFA does not ban the USSF and there is a ruling against MLS, this
author thinks FIFA will probably not allow the U.S. to host the World Cup
again as punishment. Either way, it appears that a ruling against MLS will
hurt the popularity of U.S. soccer and also will take away a potential new
sports market in the U.S.
4. FIFA will become Unwilling to Cooperate with South America,
Africa, and Asia
An adverse decision against FIFA will also present problems for other
countries wishing to start leagues in other parts of the world."'7 FIFA will
be unwilling to support startup leagues like MLS in those countries for fear
that the laws in those countries will circumvent FIFA's remaining ability to
utilize its transfer rules. 179 In turn, this author believes, a ruling against
FIFA can affect those countries' international status for World Cup
tournaments and opportunities to host the World Cup.
V. A COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE FIFA RULES
UNDER U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY
The issues dealing with player restraints have been very important in
the development of U.S. antitrust law in professional sports. 180 It seems
that the litigation at hand will also be influential in continuing the progress
of antitrust law in sports.
One issue the court looks at is whether the transfer rules and the limits
on foreign players are illegal restraints on player movement. "81 Without
considering the single entity defense, it appears that the rules imposed by
MLS are illegal restraints on player movement. Mackey clearly establishes
176. Grahame L. Jones, Going Down: Trouble at Every Level on MLS Elevator Ride,
L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
177. Copetas, supra note 5.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. CHAMPION, supra note 14, at 61.
181. Copetas, supra note 5.
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the tests required to determine this issue. 8 2  The rules would not be
considered under the per se approach because MLS, as a sports league,
requires some form of cooperation between the teams in order to be
applied. 3
The appropriate test is the rule of reason approach. Therefore, the
question is whether the MLS rules are "justified by legitimate business
purposes and [are] no more restrictive than necessary. "'4 To answer this
question, the court must balance the anticompetitive effects of the restraint
with the procompetitive effects.8 5 The players argue that they cannot move
as free agents or attain their comparable market value.8 6 MLS is arguing
that the rules are essential to maintain the integrity of the game."8 7 Further,
MLS fears that, without the rules, players will flock to the larger market
teams, hurting the smaller market teams and risking the existence of the
league. 
18 8
The arguments brought by the players and MLS are essentially the
same as those arguments brought by the players and the NFL in Mackey. 89
This author believes that the court would decide in favor of the players on
their argument. However, the main issue that will be decided in Frasier is
whether MLS is a single entity. This issue revolves around the language of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act."190 If MLS is deemed a single entity by the
courts, there will be no need to decide whether the rules imposed by MLS
are illegal restraints on player movement.'9'
182. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976).
183. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
184. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620.
185. Id.
186. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 7.
187. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
188. Id.
189. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620-21. The court should probably be concerned with the
threat to the existence of MLS as it was with the NFL in Mackey. However, there are other
means that can be utilized to preserve the league's existence, such as special contract
provisions, the draft, and collective bargaining agreements. Id.
190. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
191. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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The court has made clear that professional sports leagues can apply the
single entity defense."9 MLS is structured as a single entity.' 9 3 Therefore,
under Copperweld,194 MLS can utilize the single entity defense. Besides the
fact that MLS is structured as a single entity, MLS appears to pass the two-
factor functional test applied in Copperweld. 95 Under the first factor, the
teams and MLS have a "complete unity of interest."' 96 There is nothing to
suggest that the teams operate individually or apart from MLS. All of the
teams are owned by MLS, not by individual separate entities. 19 The whole
of MLS functions as a single corporation.' 98 The second factor also
suggests that MLS is a single entity. There are no "independent economic
factors [forming] a common plan." 99 The teams were never separate
entities that joined to form MLS. 20 MLS and the teams have always had
one common interest and there never was a sudden joining of economic
resources that had previously served different interests.2°'
Another point that should influence the court centers on the other
relevant antitrust cases where the single entity defense was raised.2°2 There
is an important distinction between this precedent and the case at hand. In
the prior cases, there was significant evidence proving that competition
192. See Seabury Management, Inc. v. Professional Golf Ass'n of Am., Inc., 878 F.
Supp. 771, 778 (D. Md. 1994). See also Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 598-99 (7th Cir. 1996).
193. About MLS, supra note 7. "MLS, a limited liability company, was organized, both
structurally and operationally, as a single entity, much like a single corporation with
operating subsidiaries or divisions." Ruskin, supra note 31, at 7.
194. See generally Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
195. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 6. The court must consider two factors in order to enforce
the single entity defense. Id.
196. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
197. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 7.
198. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
201. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
Copperweld explains exactly what is required to establish this second factor. Here, there
is no evidence that MLS and the teams ever were separate entities. In fact MLS owns all
of the 12 teams. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
202. See generally North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d
1249 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum v.
National Football League, 726 F.2d. 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984); Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1964), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
1252 (1995); McNeil v. National Football League 790 F. Supp 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
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between the teams occurred not only on the field but off the field as well.2°3
MLS and the teams do not compete off the field.2" There is little evidence
to suggest that off-the-field competition exists because there are no separate
individual interests by the teams. The only evidence suggesting competition
off the field results from the team operators performing their duties for the
corporation, MLS.2 °5 This author does not believe this evidence is
significant when compared to the complete function of MLS, its operators,
and its investors.
Based on these factors, the structure of MLS, the facts, and the
relevant case law, the court should find for MLS under the single entity
defense. There are other justifications supporting the single entity defense
for MLS. One of these justifications concerns the Bosman decision and the
players in the Fraser litigation who are seeking the same benefits. 206 In
Bosman, the court held that the transfer rules and foreign player restrictions
were illegal but the court limited its decision to EC laws. °7 Similarly, the
district court in Fraser must confine its decision to the single entity issue
under U.S. antitrust law. 2°' The district court will not deny MLS the
opportunity to use the single entity defense, unless the players have some
justification for rejecting the defense under U.S. antitrust law. 2° It is the
opinion of this author that the players have no justification, and the fact that
the ECJ decided for the players in Bosman is irrelevant to the case at hand.
There are also a number of policy justifications that provide further
support for MLS. These justifications revolve around maintaining the
integrity of the game. Preserving the integrity of the game is the motto for
203. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
204. Ruskin, supra note 31, at 7. The only competition occurs on the field. The
investors "share profits and allocate losses generally on a pro rata basis." Id.
205. Id. The team operators are "responsible for certain expenses, such as local
marketing and promotion, and team staffing, including hiring coaches and a general
manager." Id.
206. Copetas, supra note 5.
207. See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Ass'n v. Bosman,
1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (1995).
208. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). This act deals with all illegal conspiracies
that restraint interstate commerce. Id.
209. See Seabury Management, Inc. v. Professional Golf Ass'n. of Am., Inc., 878 F.
Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1994). The court allowed the single entity defense. Id. See also
Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 598-99
(7th Cir. 1996). The court stated that the single entity defense could be utilized by a sports
league. Id.
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FIFA. 21' This motto is essential to soccer's existence and it increases fan
support throughout the world. 21 ' FIFA realizes that soccer is no longer just
a sport, but it is also a business. However, FIFA does not want to see
MLS, and more specifically the game of soccer, turn all of its concentration
towards large money potential. Further, without some form of control over
the players' salaries, MLS and the game of soccer will succumb to the
financial allure that plagues other professional sports leagues. This in turn
will drive away the fans from the world's most popular game.
One last factor that the district court may want to consider is the
reprisal from FIFA should the court rule in favor of the players. FIFA
could simply expel the USSF from international soccer, ban FIFA
acceptance of MLS, forbid the U.S. from hosting any future World Cup
games, and forbid new leagues in South America, Africa, and Asia.212
These are extreme reprisals but they are very likely because FIFA does not
need U.S. support to make money. Again, soccer is the most popular sport
in the world, and FIFA already has its fan base.2"3 Also, FIFA will not
tolerate countries ignoring its rules.2 14
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of these relevant justifications and the fact that the structure of
MLS is a single entity under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court in
Frasier, should determine that there was no violation under the Act. Even
if the court were to consider Bosman as a policy justification, the U.S.
district court should look to the corporate structure of MLS and recognize
that it has centralized control over the operations of the league. Bosman
was decided under European Community law.21 5 Similarly, the District
Court in Fraser needs to answer the single entity issue under U.S. antitrust
law.2" 6 If the court considers this issue, this author believes the court will
find that MLS is a single entity and should not be subjected to antitrust
scrutiny. Further, this author concludes that the policy arguments raised
210. Copetas, supra note 5.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Engel, supra note 169.
214. Copetas, supra note 5.
215. See generally Case C-415/93, Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Ass'n
v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (1995).
216. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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show that the U.S. wants to maintain its status in the international world of
soccer and a ruling adverse to MLS will severely threaten the U.S.'s
position and interest in the game.
Mark D. Mako

